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A Lopez Legacy?:

The Federalism Debate Renewed,
But Not Resolved
INTRODUCTION

For nearly sixty years, the United States Supreme Court has allowed
Congress free reign to legislate under its Commerce Clause power.' During
that time, invoking its commerce power, Congress has passed laws
regulating everything from civil rights to loan sharking. ' No more. A
divided Court, in a decision that generated six different opinions,3 found
that Congress had stretched its commerce power beyond constitutional
limits4 by enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990. 5
In affirming the decision in United States v. Lopez,6 the Court
invalidated the federal law aimed at curbing gun-related violence in schools.

The majority indicated it would apply a stricter standard in the future when

reviewing Congressional regulation of activities that "affect" interstate
commerce.7 The Court might be sending a message to Congress to tread
carefully when federalizing criminal law.' In reaction to a rising tide of
violent crime in America in recent years, Congress has used its commerce
power to enact many criminal statutes, including those making car-jacking, 9

1. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936). This was the last time the
Supreme Court struck down legislation Congress had passed using its Commerce Clause
power.
2. See generally Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964);
Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
3. United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995).
4. Id. at 1626. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote, "We hold that the Act exceeds the
authority of Congress '[t]o regulate Commerce ... among the several States .... 'Id.
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
5. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994). The Act forbids "any individual knowingly to possess
a firearm at a place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone." Id. at § 922(q)(2)(A).
6. 115 S.Ct. 1624 (1995).
7. Id. at 1630. ("[Tlhe proper test requires an analysis of whether the regulated
activity 'substantially affects' interstate commerce.")
8. See David 0. Stewart, Back to the Commerce Clause: The Supreme CourtHas Yet
to Reveal the True Significanceof Lopez, A.B.A. J., July 1995, at 46.
9. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1994).
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machine gun possession,"° and destruction of buildings" federal crimes.
Congress' power to legislate in the area of activities that only "affect"
interstate commerce may be in question as a result of this ruling.' 2
In a more general sense, the Rehnquist majority may be signaling a
continuing concern with federalism issues.' 3 The majority believed that to
uphold the Congressional rationale (subsequently added to the Act after
passage) for adopting this measure, the Court would have to "pile inference
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States."' 4 The opinion indicates that the great deference
shown to congressional enactments in the past may be coming to an end.
If so, the decision could be even more far-reaching. In his concurrence,
Justice Clarence Thomas advocates doing away with the "substantial effects
[sic]" test altogether, calling it "but an innovation of the 20th century."' 5
A move away from giving great deference to Congress in deciding what
"affects commerce" could also put civil rights and environmental legislation
passed under the Commerce Clause power in some jeopardy. 6
But the ruling may go even further. In his dissent, Justice Souter noted
the parallel in development of Commerce Clause and Due Process
jurisprudence in the late 1930s, when the Court began to show great
deference to legislative policy judgments on commercial regulation. 7
Souter questioned whether the Court would like to return to the pre-New
Deal substantive due process doctrine epitomized by cases like Lochner v.
New York,' 8 which he characterized as "the untenable jurisprudence from
which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years ago."' 9 Souter observed
that the majority's reference to activities that were commercial or noncommercial in nature sounded much like the old distinction between what
directly and indirectly affected commerce and, as in Lochner, the process of
deciding how much interference with contractual freedom was fatal.20
10.
11.
12.
reluctant
13.
14.
15.
16.
Criminal
17.
18.
19.
20.

18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) (1994).
18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
See Stewart, supra note 8, at 48. However, lower courts have, to date, been
to invalidate many of these statutes post-Lopez. See infra Part IV.
See Stewart, supra note 8, at 46.
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1634.
Id. at 1648 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm Than Good: AssessingFederalizationof
Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 476 (1994).
Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1652 (Souter, J., dissenting).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
Id. at 1654.
Id.
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Court review of congressional wisdom, he stated, is the "old judicial
pretension discredited and abandoned in 1937."'2
The Lopez opinion has the potential to inhibit Congress' ability to deal
with the violent crime wave sweeping the country, upset the tenuous balance
between federal and local government power in the federalism debate, and
disturb decades of precedent in the area of judicial review of Congressional
enactments under the Commerce Clause.
This casenote will trace the development of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence throughout the years, culminating in this watershed ruling in
Lopez, explore the majority reasoning in striking down the Gun Free School
Zones Act, and explain how this Court's approach differs from that taken
in the last half-century. It will also report how the lower federal courts are
responding to a wave of appeals generated by Lopez and make some
predictions as to what the decision may indicate about how the Court will
analyze such cases in the future.
I.

HISTORY

Article I, section 8 of the Constitution gives Congress the power "to
regulate Commerce... among the several States ... ."" It is the primary
source of Congress' regulatory power and an implicit limitation on a state's
regulatory power.23 It was one of the enumerated powers that was not
specifically addressed by the Constitutional Convention.24 As a result,
there is no direct history as to the meaning of the Clause, but one can
examine the circumstances surrounding the call of the Convention to get
some idea of what the Framers believed.2 5
The Articles of Confederation did not grant the Continental Congress
any power over commerce between the states, leading to the establishment
by the states of trade barriers and tariffs.26 The economic chaos which
resulted prompted political leaders, fearing dissolution of the union, to call
for the convention.2 7 One of the primary goals was to amend the powers
of the national government to allow it to deal more effectively with multi-

21. Id. at 1656.
22. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
23. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, §5-4, at 305-06 (2nd
ed. 1988).
24. See I RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:
SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE § 4.3, at 263 (1986).
25. Id.
26. Id. at 264.
27. Id.
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state problems.2" Although there is little doubt that the Federalists intended
Congress to have significant powers in this area, there were those opposed
to a grant of a power great enough to remove all state autonomy.29
This historical backdrop does give the Court at least some guidance in
interpreting the Commerce Clause; this power was intended to remove the
trade barrier situation which had plagued the states and was to be broad
enough to deal with economic problems of the nation as a unit.30 At the
same time, there was some opposition to granting the federal government
wide ranging power over local activities.3 Historical materials provide
insufficient guidance as to how to reconcile concerns about the national
economy with state autonomy.32 As a result, the Court, over the years, has
had to analyze the purpose and meaning of the commerce power.33
The scope of the federal commerce power was first suggested by Chief
Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden.34 In this case, Ogden challenged
New York's grant of a steamboat monopoly to a private operator on the
grounds that it violated the Commerce Clause because it was in conflict with
a federal statute which licensed ships in the coastal trade." The actual
holding was narrow; the monopoly was invalidated under the Supremacy
Clause.36 But Marshall's opinion gave a broad reading to the powers of
Congress under the Commerce Clause.37 He defined commerce as
"intercourse" extending into each state and suggested that Congress had the
power to regulate "commerce which concerns more states than one."38 He
indicated the power extended to all activity having any interstate impact,
however indirect.39 Marshall's view was that the power was plenary:
absolute within its sphere and subject only to the 4Constitution's affirmative
prohibitions
on the exercise of federal authority. " "The wisdom and
the
discretion of congress [sic], their identity with the people, and the influence
which their constituents possess at elections, are ... the sole restraints on

28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

Id. at 264-65.
Id.
Id. at 265-66.
Id.
Id.
Id.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
Id. at 1-2, 8.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210.
See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, at 267.
Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 189, 194.
See TRIBE, supra note 23, §5-4, at 306.
See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 196.
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. . . its abuse."' Marshall described the "internal commerce of a state" as
beyond the reach of federal power, but had also created a standard under
which few commercial activities would meet the definition of internal
commerce.4" Historians are unsure of how Marshall would have viewed
the tension which grew between the federal exercise of the commerce power
and the protection of state autonomy, but Felix Frankfurter viewed the
opinion as a rejection of the Tenth Amendment as a limitation on the
commerce power.43
The Court's Commerce Clause decisions immediately following
Gibbons dealt primarily with the validity of state action that might conflict
with "dormant" federal commerce clause power as opposed to congressional
enactments under the clause.44 These decisions reflected inconsistent
doctrine. Some cases decided during this period were consistent with
Marshall's view in Gibbons, suggesting that the primary limits on the
commerce power were legislative and political instead of judicial and
constitutional.4 ' Others, however, began articulating a theory of dual
sovereignty that would later be used to limit congressional power. In 1851,
the Court decided Cooley v. Board of Wardens,46 establishing the principle
that commercial subjects requiring uniform national regulation could be
regulated by Congress whereas subjects of local concern could be regulated
by the states to some extent. 7 Although this opinion did not attempt to
define federal commerce clause power, its distinctions between "national"
and "local" would be used in the future by justices trying to restrict federal
power.48

In 1870, the Court for the first time struck down a Congressional

enactment'under the Commerce Clause. In United States v. DeWitt,49 the
Court invalidated a federal law prohibiting sales of illuminating oils
flammable at less than 110 degrees as a "police regulation" relating
exclusively to the internal trade of the states.50 By the late 1800s, that
distinction between interstate commerce and a state's internal activities gave
rise to the "dual federalism" concept: the theory that the Tenth Amendment
41. Id. at 197.
194).

42. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.4, at 268 (citing Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id.
See TRIBE, supra note 23, §5-4, at 306-07.
Id. at 306 n.6.
53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.4, at 270.
Id.
76 U.S. (9 Wal.) 41 (1869).
Id. at 41.
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reserved the regulation of some activities to the states.5 This principle
was underlying the Court's ruling that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, passed
by Congress in 1890, did not apply to manufacturing.52 Manufacturing
was perceived as a "local activity" reserved for state regulation and the
Court required a "direct" connection to interstate commerce for it to come
under federal regulation.53
This classification was far more restrictive of congressional power than
the approach suggested by Marshall in Gibbons, but the Court did allow
some exceptions.54 Congress was able to regulate what seemed to be an
intrastate activity if it was connected to the interstate movement of goods or
services under the "stream of commerce" theory." Justices also allowed
federal regulation of intrastate railroad rates in competition with interstate
routes, reasoning that Congress had the power to regulate intrastate matters
that had a "close and substantial" relation to interstate traffic to preserve
efficiency and safety.56
By the early 1900s, the Court had apparently had enough of what it
perceived as legislative tampering with social and economic matters and
began to strike down a wide variety of state and federal laws.57 Justices
seemed most unhappy with laws that interfered with the employer and
employee relationship.58 In 1905, for example, the Court struck down state
maximum hour legislation under the Due Process clause in Lochner v. New
York." During this period, the Court did sustain some Congressional
enactments which established safety standards and regulation of hours for
railroad employees,6" and some actions that regulated the nature of items
which could be shipped in interstate commerce to achieve "police power"
62 the Court
ends.6 However, on a 5-4 vote in Hammer v. Dagenhart,
invalidated a federal law that prohibited interstate transportation of goods

51. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.5, at 274.
52. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
53. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.5, at 274.
54. See TRIBE, supra note 23, §5-4, at 308.
55. Id.; see, e.g., Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905) (stockyards can
be regulated because they are part of interstate commerce).
56. Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342, 351 (1914).
57. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.6, at 279.
58. Id. at 280.

59. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
60. See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co. v. I.C.C., 221 U.S. 612 (1911).
61. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.6, at 281; see, e.g., Hipolite Egg Co. v. United
States, 220 U.S. 45 (1911) (upholding prohibition of impure food and drugs).
62. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
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coming from a manufacturing facility that employed young children. 6' The
majority found that the act exceeded federal commerce power because it
regulated conditions of production, a matter reserved for state regulation by
the Tenth Amendment.6 4 The majority distinguished this from other cases
where Congress had been permitted to set terms of interstate transportation
of products by finding there is nothing harmful about products made by
children. The previous cases, the Court found, eliminated harmful items
from interstate commerce.65
At the root of most of the decisions in this pre-Depression era was the
Court's use of the Tenth Amendment to reserve some subjects for state
authority. 66 The election of 1932 brought a public mandate for a new
approach to ending the Depression, but the Court had indicated over the past
fifty years that it might not allow new federal approaches to economic
problems.6 7 In fact, the Court did begin striking down the so-called "New
Deal" legislation and in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States68 the
Court's discussion of the federal commerce power indicated it would
continue to do so. 6 9 The Court's majority found that employment practices
of a poultry business did not have sufficient "direct" connections to
interstate commerce and flatly refused to find a national economic crisis
sufficient to justify use of a federal power to deal with internal matters of
a state which only indirectly affected commerce.70 By the landmark Carter
v. Carter Coal Co.,71 the Court's majority had made it clear it did not
believe that labor relations had a close enough tie to interstate commerce for
state regulation to be usurped by federal commerce power.7 2
After President Roosevelt was re-elected in 1936, he unveiled his
infamous "Court Packing Plan," asking for Congressional authority to
appoint an additional federal judge for each judge who was seventy years
old and had served on the Court for at least ten years.73 Fifteen Supreme
Court Justices could be appointed under the plan.74 Roosevelt's plan was

Id. at 277.
64. Id. at 275-76.
65. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.6, at 282.
66. Id. at 284.
67. Id. at 285.
68. 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
69. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.7, at 286.
70. 295 U.S. 495, 548 (1935).
71. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding federal regulation of miner's wages and hours was
outside commerce power).
72. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.7, at 288.
73. Id. at 289.
63.

74. Id.
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to facilitate implementation of his New Deal legislation which had been
thwarted by the Court." Although the plan was never implemented, the
current Court began to "reform" itself, no longer using substantive due
process and equal protection to overturn laws which interfered with
traditional ideas of economic freedom.76 In the watershed case of NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,7 the Court abandoned its analytical
approach to the Commerce Clause and returned to Chief Justice Marshall's
original view. 78 The federal commerce power was now interpreted as a
plenary power and the case would be analyzed without first deciding
whether the activity was one reserved for state authority under the Tenth
Amendment.79 Since that time, the Court has deferred to a finding by
Congress that regulated activities have had a "substantial economic effect"
on interstate commerce if those findings rest on a "rational basis."80 This
doctrine makes irrelevant any determination of what is "in" or "out" of the
"current of commerce."'"
In the next two years, the Court made it clear it was rejecting the Tenth
Amendment as a limitation on federal power under the Commerce
Clause. 2 In United States v. Darby,83 the Court upheld direct federal
regulation of wages and hours of employees engaged in the production of
goods for intrastate shipment, finding that Congress could regulate intrastate
activities that "so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of the power of
Congress over it ...
.""' The Court stated explicitly that the Tenth
Amendment did not serve as a basis for restricting the commerce power:
Our conclusion is unaffected by the Tenth Amendment .... The amendment states but a truism that all is
retained which has not been surrendered. There is
nothing in the history of its adoption to suggest that it was
more than declaratory of the relationship between the
national and state governments as it had been established
by the Constitution before the amendment or that its

75. Id.
76. Id. at 290.
77. 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (holding Congress can regulate labor relations at integrated
manufacturing facility; work stoppage would seriously affect interstate commerce).
78. See TRIBE, supra note 23, §5-4, at 309.
79. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.8, at 290.
80. See TRIBE, supra note 23, §5-4, at 309.
81. Id.
82. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.9, at 297.
83. 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
84. Id. at 118.
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purpose was other than to allay fears that the new national
government might seek to exercise powers not granted,
and that the states might not be able to exercise filly their
reserved powers.8 5
In 1942, the Court's move to recognizing a plenary commerce power
based on economic theory was complete.86 It found that an intrastate
activity on a very small scale could be federally regulated if it might affect
interstate commerce when combined with similar activities by others.87 In
recent years, Congress has relied on this "cumulative effect" or "aggregate
economic effect" principle to constitutionally enact civil rights legislation,88
some criminal statutes, 9 and others.
Since 1937, there have been only two Court decisions which directly
limited congressional power under the Commerce Clause and both involved
an attempt by Congress to directly regulate state, as opposed to private,
activities.9" Of those cases, National League of Cities v. UrseryP' and
New York v. United States,9 2 the former was overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authorit93 in 1985. 9' Garcia left the
decision about what activities were for state regulation and which were for
federal control up to the political system, holding that this "line" between
interstate and local commerce was not for the courts to draw.95

85. Id. at 123-24.
86. See ROTUNDA, supra note 24, §4.9, at 299.
87. See Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111 (1942) (holding that a marketing quota could
be applied to farmer growing wheat for himself, since that affects wheat supply which, in
turn, affects commodity price).
88. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 201(a) (1994), upheld in Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S.
294 (1964) (enforcing prohibition of racial discrimination against small restaurant, relying
on the combined effect of segregated restaurants on interstate commerce).
89. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 891-896 (1994), upheld in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.
146 (1971) (upholding federal criminalization of loan sharking because class of activity

affects interstate commerce).

90. Herman Schwartz, U.S. v. Lopez: The Feds Lose a Piece of Their Rock, LEGAL

TIMES, May 8, 1995, at 25.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

426 U.S. 833 (1976).
505 U.S. 144 (1992).
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
See Schwartz, supra note 90, at 25.
Id. at 28.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

II. CASE FACTS
Twelfth-grader Alfonso Lopez, Jr., inadvertently began the Commerce
Clause controversy generated by this case when he brought a concealed .38
caliber handgun to his school, Edison High, in San Antonio, Texas, on
March 10, 1992.96 Acting on a tip, authorities confiscated the unloaded
weapon and five bullets from Lopez, who told them someone had given him
the gun to deliver it after school to "Jason," who planned to use it in a gang
war. 97 Lopez was to receive forty dollars for the delivery.98

Lopez was initially charged with violating a Texas statute, 99 a third
degree felony. Bringing a gun on to school grounds has been a felony
under Texas law since at least 1974,0 but those charges were dropped the
next day when authorities decided to prosecute him under 18 U.S.C. §
922(q), the Federal Gun Free School Zones Act.'"' Lopez pleaded not
guilty and moved to dismiss his indictment on grounds that § 922(q) was
unconstitutional because Congress had no power to legislate control over
public schools.' 2 The district court found that § 922(q) was a legitimate
exercise of Congress' power to regulate activities in and affecting0 3commerce
and that the "business" of schools affects interstate commerce.1

Lopez was found guilty in a bench trial and was sentenced to six
months in jail followed by two years of supervised release. 1 4 His appeal
The Fifth Circuit
focused solely on the constitutionality of § 922(q).' °5
framed its discussion of the Lopez case in Tenth Amendment terms,
characterizing the issue as one which "pits the states' traditional authority
over education and schooling against the federal government's acknowl06
edged power to regulate firearms in or affecting interstate commerce."'1
Because the government had argued that § 922(q) was no different than
other federal firearm legislation Congress had enacted under the Commerce
Clause, the court undertook a lengthy analysis of the legislative history of
those laws.'0 7 The court found that the laws almost always require the
96.
(1995).
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1345 (5th Cir. 1993), aff'd, 115 S.Ct. 1624
Id.
Id.
Tex. Penal Code § 46.04(a).
Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1345 n.I.
Id. at 1345.
Id.
Id.
Id.
2 F.3d at 1345.
Id. at 1346.
Id. at 1348-53.
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government to prove a nexus, that is some connection between the firearm
possession and interstate commerce.10 8 The court found no such nexus
requirement in § 922(q).' °9 It also found that the valid federal gun laws
which lacked such a nexus pertained to commercial actions involving the
firearms business and not to simple individual possession."0
The Crime Control Act of 19901" included the Gun Free School
Zones Act of 1990 and enacted § 922(q). Both the House and Senate
sponsors of the Act made lengthy floor statements about the section, but
neither mentioned anything about commerce." 2 Although the appellate
court in Lopez did find reference to school violence in legislative debate on
the Act, it found no testimony concerning the effect of the violence on
schools or of the impact on commerce of firearms in schools." 3 The
court also noted an exchange between a House Subcommittee Chair and the
head of a Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms Division ("BAT").
The BATF agent opined that this Act would be a major departure from
other federal firearms legislation in that it would give the federal government original jurisdiction in enforcement of a federal law at the local
level." 4 Subcommittee Chairman Rep. William Hughes found the Act to
constitute a major departure from the traditional federalism concept which
basically defers to state and local governments to enforce their laws."'
The Lopez court acknowledged precedent which indicate that courts
must defer to congressional findings that regulated activity substantially
affects interstate commerce, if there is any rational basis for the findings. ' 16 However, it found that Congress made no such findings in
enacting the Gun Free School Zones Act." 7 While the court found that
Congressional enactments are presumed Constitutional, in some areas the
presumption has less force." 8 The court found the issue to be a jurisdictional one and that any expansion of federal power is at the expense of the

108. Id. at 1347.
109. Id. at 1348.
110. Id.
Il1. P.L. 101-647, 101st. Cong., 2d Sess., 104 Stat. 4789-4968.
112. See Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1360.
113. Id. at 1359.
114. Id. at 1360 n.39.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 1363; see, e.g.; Preseault v. I.C.C., 494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990).
117. Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1364.
118. Id. (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938) (stating
that there may be less presumption of constitutionality when legislation is within specific
prohibition of the Constitution)).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

powers reserved to the state by the Tenth Amendment." 9 The court.
reasoned that if Congress, without supportive findings or legislative history,
could bar firearms possession based solely upon proximity to a school on
the theory that education affects commerce, then Congress could also bar
"lead pencils, 'sneakers,' Game Boys, or slide rules."' 20 The court left
open the possibility that similar legislation with adequate legislative findings
could be sustained in the future and concluded that Congress failed to locate
21
§ 922(q) within the Commerce Clause.'
Reaching a contrary result, the Ninth Circuit also considered the Gun
Free School Zones Act in United States v. Edwards. 22 The defendant in
Edwards was charged with violating the Act after officers from the
Sacramento, California Police Department gang unit searched his car in a
high school parking lot and found two rifles. 23 This defendant appealed
his conviction on the theory that the Act violated the Tenth Amendment
because Congress did not have authority under the Commerce Clause to
enact the law. 24 He also relied on United States v. Bass,'25 where the
Court reversed the conviction of a man charged with being a felon in
possession of a firearm because of the government's failure to show a nexus
26
between the activity regulated by the law and interstate commerce.
However, the Edwards court found the Gun Free School Zones Act
distinguishable from the statute in Bass because the Act did not expressly
require the government to establish the nexus between possession of a
firearm in a school zone and interstate commerce.127 The Edwards court
relied instead on its decision in United States v. Evans 2 ' where it reviewed the enactment in a highly deferential manner and found it was
reasonable for Congress to conclude that possession of firearms represents
a class of activities which affects interstate commerce. 29 The court
reasoned that violence created through the possession of firearms adversely
affects the national economy and as a result, it was reasonable for Congress

119. Id.
120. Id. at 1367.
121. Id. at 1368.
122. 13 F.3d 291 (9th Cir. 1993).
123. Id. at 292.
124. Id.
125. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
126. Id. at 347.
127. Edwards, 13 F.3d at 292-93.
128. 928 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1991) (defendant convicted of violating federal law
prohibiting possession of unregistered machine gun).
129. Id. at 862.
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to regulate firearm possession under the Commerce Clause. 3 ' The court
found its decision consistent with both the Supreme Court's holding in Perez
v. United States,' which stated Congress need not make particularized
findings in order to legislate,'32 and with Katzenbach v. McClung33
where the court found "that [where] the legislators, in light of the facts and
testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a chosen regulatory
scheme necessary to the protection of commerce our investigation is at an
end."' 34 The appellate opinion in Lopez stated that courts cannot determine
if there is a rational basis for a Congressional finding if neither the legislative
history nor the statute reveals such a finding."' The Edwards court called
the Fifth Circuit's Lopez opinion "squarely contrary" to the Court's holding
in Perez and accused the Fifth Circuit of ignoring McClung.'36 Thus, the
Fifth Circuit reasoned that the lack of a nexus requirement in the law was a
fatal flaw. The Ninth Circuit found such a requirement unnecessary.
For those anxious to discover whether the United States Supreme Court
would strike down a Congressional enactment under the Commerce Clause
for the first time in nearly 60 years, the news came quickly. In plain
language in the third sentence of the majority opinion, Chief Justice William
Rehnquist wrote: "We hold that the Act exceeds the authority of Congress
'[t]o regulate Commerce... among the several States.. .. ,137
While tracing the history and development of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause, the Chief Justice consistently emphasized the
Court's findings of limitations on the power. He stressed that even though
modem day precedents have greatly expanded the commerce power,
beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.'38 in 1937, the
Court has also confirmed that it has an outer limit. Although the Court in
Jones & Laughlin Steel did away with the "direct" and "indirect" effects on
interstate commerce test 139 and substituted "close and substantial relation,"' 40 the majority opinion also emphasized the warning that the power
must be considered in light of "our dual system of government and may not
be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so remote
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
402 U.S. 146 (1971).
Id. at 156.
379 U.S. 294 (1964).
Id. at 303-04.'
Lopez, 2 F.3d at 1363-64.
Edwards, 13 F.3d at 295.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1626.
301 U.S. 1 (1937).
Id. at 36-38.
Id. at 37.
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that to embrace them . . . would effectually obliterate the distinction
between what is national4 and what is local and create a completely
centralized government."'
From precedent, the majority identified three areas of activity that
Congress may regulate under the Commerce Power: use of the channels of
interstate commerce; the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons
and things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only
from intrastate activities; or those activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.' 42 Rehnquist then found that the Lopez case fell within the
third category. 4 3 He also sought to clarify what he says has been some
ambiguity in previous cases about whether the activity must "affect" or
"substantially affect" interstate commerce and concludes the proper test is
"substantially affect."' 44
In applying precedent to the Lopez case itself, Rehnquist found that gun
possession on school property, criminalized by § 922(q), had nothing to do
with "commerce" and further, was not an essential part of a larger regulation
of economic activity in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut
unless the interstate activity were regulated.' 45 In so finding, Rehnquist
distinguished Lopez from previous cases which have used the aggregation
principle of Wickard v. Filburn. 6
Second, the majority found no jurisdictional element in § 922(q) which
would assure that, in each case, the firearm possession affected interstate
commerce.' 47 The Court in United States v. Bass 148 set aside the conviction of a defendant convicted of violating the former 18 U.S.C. § 1202(a)
which made it illegal for a felon to "receive, possess, or transport in
commerce or affecting commerce . . . any firearm .' ' 149 The Court found
that the government had failed to show the requisite nexus with interstate
commerce. 5
The Rehnquist majority, however, wrote that unlike the
Bass statute, § 922(q) has no nexus requirement that would limit its

141. Id.
142. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
143. Id. at 1630.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1630-31.
146. 317 U.S. I11 (1942); see supra note 87 and accompanying text for explanation of
aggregation principle.
147. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
148. 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
149. Id. at 337.
150. Id. at 347.
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application to firearm possessions that have a connection with or an effect
on interstate commerce.151
Although the Court notes that formal legislative findings regarding
affects on interstate commerce are not mandatory in order for Congress to
pass valid legislation under the Commerce Clause, it also said those
findings, absent here, would help in evaluating the legislative judgment that
the activity in question substantially affected interstate commerce.'
The
Court did "pause" to consider the arguments that the government in fact did
assert in a subsequent amendment to § 922(q). 54
The government argued that Congress, through previous enactments,
had expertise in gun regulation.'
However, the Court found that such
previous findings did not justify § 922(q) because they did not address the
subject matter of this law nor its relationship to interstate commerce. 56
The Court agreed with the Fifth Circuit that new ground is broken with this
legislation. 57
The amended congressional findings included an argument that
possession of a gun in a school zone may result in violent crime which
could be expected to affect the national economy through insurance costs,
through discouraging travel to places that are perceived as dangerous, and
by threatening the learning process resulting in a less productive citizenry.'
All of this, the government argued, has an adverse affect on the
country's economic well-being.'" The majority was concerned about the
implications of these "cost of crime" arguments, hypothesizing that under
this reasoning, Congress could regulate not only violent crime, but all
activities that might lead to it, regardless of how tenuous their connection
to interstate commerce. 6 ° Also troubling to the Rehnquist majority was
that under the "national productivity" reasoning, Congress could regulate
any activity it found related to the economic productivity of citizens,

151. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1631.
152. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 304 (1964).
153. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632..
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (citing United States v. Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342, 1366 (5th
Cir. 1993) ("[P]rior federal enactments ... [do not] speak to the subject matter of section
922(q) or its relationship to interstate commerce. Indeed, section 922(q) plows thoroughly
new ground .... )).
158. Id. at 1632.

159. Id.
160. Id.
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including marriage, divorce, and child custody.161 In conclusion, the
Court could not perceive any limitation on federal power under this
62
reasoning, even in areas where states historically have been sovereign.
The majority was especially critical of Justice Breyer's dissent in this area.
He reasoned that gun-related violence is a serious problem which has an
adverse effect on classroom learning and that represents a substantial threat
to trade and commerce. 63 The majority countered that under that reasoning,
Congress could regulate the educational process directly by, for example,
determining that a school's curriculum had a "significant" effect on
classroom learning because such learning had a substantial effect on
The majority also responded to the Breyer
interstate commerce. 64
dissent's contention that the educational process was a commercial activity.
Under that rationale, Rehnquist wrote, Congress could find that child rearing
was commercial because it provides a service: to equip65children with the
skills they need to survive in life and in the workplace.
The Court acknowledged that a determination of whether an intrastate
activity is commercial or noncommercial might result in some legal
uncertainty, but, that it is inevitable.166 It then concluded that possession
of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an "economic activity that
might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of interstate
commerce."'' 67 The Court found that the respondent was a local student,
there was no indication that he had recently moved in interstate commerce
and there was no requirement that his possession of the gun have any
substantial tie to interstate commerce. 68 To uphold the government's
contentions, Rehnquist wrote, would require the court to "pile inference
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional
authority under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort
retained by the States. ''169
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O'Connor,
noted the Court's historical struggle to interpret the Commerce Clause which
gave him "pause" about the majority decision. 7 ° And although he reads
James Madison's writings in The Federalist Papers to say the balance
161.
162.
163.
i64.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 1659-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1633.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1634.
Id.
Id.
concurring).
Id. at 1634 (Kennedy, J.,
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between state and federal power is entrusted to the political process, not the
courts, Kennedy said the judicial role cannot be completely renunciated.' 7 l
He found that the statute in Lopez "upsets the federal balance to such a
degree that renders it an unconstitutional assertion of the commerce
power."172
In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas went much further. He
would completely restructure the "substantial effects" test which he believes
"iftaken to its logical extreme would give Congress a 'police power' over
all aspects of American life.""17 Thomas indicated that if not for stare
decisis and reliance concerns, he would vote to turn the clock back some
sixty years to what he calls the "original understanding" of Commerce
Clause analysis.'74
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion traces the parallel evolution of
Commerce Clause and Due Process analysis by the Court over the years,
criticizing the majority for returning to what he calls the "untenable
jurisprudence from which the Court extricated itself almost 60 years
ago."' 75 Souter cautioned against returning to an era where the court
reviewed legislation for congressional wisdom. He said the only question
for the Court is whether the legislative judgment (that an activity substantially affects interstate commerce) is within the realm of reason.' 76
Justice Breyer's heavily footnoted dissent, joined by Justices Ginsberg,
Souter, and Stevens, attempted to demonstrate how Congress could have
rationally found that possession of a gun in a school zone affects interstate
commerce.'77 He emphasized that the question for the court is whether
Congress could have rationally made that finding, not whether the activity
did have sufficient impact on interstate commerce.' 78 Breyer cites statistics to support his view that education has "long been inextricably intertwined with the Nation's economy."'7 He reasons that any widespread
and serious threat to teaching and learning also threatens the commerce to
which that educational process is tied. 18

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

1639.
1640.
1642 (Thomas, J., concurring).
1650 n.8.
1654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
1656.
1657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1658.
1659.
1661.
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III. ANALYSIS
The Court's conservative majority, long concerned about federalism
issues, saw a perfect opportunity in Lopez to reign in Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause. 8 ' The majority's decision is inconsistent with
precedent, and has potential adverse consequences, both short and long term.
Some analysts believe that the firestorm of controversy over this opinion
was overstated, due to the Court's decision in United States v. Robertson,'82 just a month after Lopez.'83 In Robertson, the Court upheld the
defendant's conviction under a section of the federal Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO")."8 4 It prohibits "acquisition of
any interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise which is
engaged in, or the activities of which affect, interstate or foreign commerce.' '" 8 Robertson had invested in a gold mine with proceeds from drug
dealing.'86 The Ninth Circuit reversed his conviction on the grounds that
the government had failed to introduce sufficient evidence proving that the
8 7 Finding that
mine was engaged in or affected interstate commerce.
Robertson moved equipment in interstate commerce, hired employees who
traveled in interstate commerce and transported gold out of the state, the
As a
Supreme Court held that his corporation engaged in commerce.'
the
of
activities
result, the Court did not address the question of whether
8 9 Consequently, Robertson can
gold mine "affected" interstate commerce.
be easily distinguished from Lopez. In Lopez, the majority specifically held
that the case was one which fell squarely into the "affecting" commerce
category for analysis. 9 °
The first problem with the majority analysis is its disregard for stare
decisis. In his dissent, Justice Souter succinctly stated the standard of
181. See generally David S. Gehrig, Note, The Gun Free School Zones Act: The
Shootout Over Legislative Findings, the Commerce Clause, and Federalism, 22 HASTINGS

CONST. L.Q. 179 (1994)(observing that in the last twenty five years, the Supreme Court has
invoked the Tenth Amendment more often to preserve state sovereignty and predicting that

the Court would address these concerns when considering Lopez).
182. 115 S.Ct. 1732 (1995).
183. See Harvey Berkman, Second Commerce Clause Ruling Calms the Waters, NAT'L
L.J., May 15, 1995 at A7.
184. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. at 1732.
185. 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1994).
186. Robertson, 115 S.Ct. at 1732-33.
187. United States v. Robertson, 15 F.3d 862, 868 (9th. Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S.Ct.
1732 (1995).
188. Robertson, 115 S. Ct. at 1733.
189. Id.
190. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1630.
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review for Congressional legislation under the Commerce Clause: "[w]e
defer to what is often merely implicit congressional judgment that its
regulation addresses a subject substantially affecting interstate commerce 'if
there is any rational basis for such a finding."' 19' Since the mid 1930s, the
Court has afforded great deference to policy judgments on the part of
Congress under both the Commerce and Due Process Clauses.' 92 That
deference in Due Process Clause cases actually became part of the standard
of rational basis review.'93 As Justice Souter's dissenting, opinion in
Lopez noted, the parallel in Commerce Clause analysis came later with
acceptance of the aggregation doctrine in Wickard v. Filburn.'94 The
Court adhered to the principle for many years and stated it outright in 1964
in Katzenbach v. McClung:'95 "where we find that the legislators, in light
of the facts and testimony before them, have a rational basis for finding a
chosen regulatory scheme necessary to the protection of commerce, our
investigation is at an end."' 96 The Court has followed this rational basis
review, refraining from independent judicial policy judgments, for sixty
years. The Rehnquist majority, therefore, disregarded precedent in framing
the question as "Does the activity affect interstate commerce?" instead of "Is
there a rational basis for Congress to find that the activity affects interstate
commerce?"' 9 7 The latter is the correct application of rational basis
standard of review under the Court's own precedent. As Justice Souter's
opinion noted, the Lopez majority indicated that the deference should not be
as great if the activity is not commercial in nature, a distinction he compares
with the old "directly affects" and "indirectly affects" commerce distinction
198
discredited many years ago.
Even the concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O'Connor, noted the apparent detour from modem day Commerce Clause
jurisprudence. A cautious Justice Kennedy wrote that the judicial struggle
to interpret the Commerce Clause during the time our economic system was
transformed into the single national market we have today gives him

191. Id. at 1651 (citing Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Assn., 452
U.S. 264, 276 (1981)).
192. See Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1652-53 (Souter, J., dissenting).
193. See United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
194. 317 U.S. 111, 125, 127-29 (1942).
195. 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
196. Id. at 303-04.
197. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("[T]he specific question
before us... is not whether the 'regulated activity sufficiently affected interstate commerce,'
but rather, whether Congress could have had a 'rationalbasis' for so concluding").
198. Lopez, 115 S.Ct. at 1653.
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"pause" about the Lopez decision.'99 Kennedy tried to limit the scope of
the majority opinion by assuring readers that "commercial" transactions will
continue to fall under Congress' broad authority to regulate under the
Commerce Clause.200 This is little comfort since the Court has such a
difficult time defining what is "commercial." This is not surprising, since it
is one of the reasons the distinction was deleted from Commerce Clause
analysis many years ago."' Justice Rehnquist found that possession of a
gun in a school zone is not an economic activity2 2 but Justice Breyer
20 3
found that the educational process itself is a commercial activity.
Justice Rehnquist's view would arguably invalidate the foundation that
upheld civil rights cases, like Katzenbach v. McClung,20 4 and some
criminal statutes, like Perez v. United States,"5 because in each case, the
in Katzenbach and use of force in Perez, was not
transaction, discrimination
20 6
itself "commercial.,
Not only did the majority opinion fail to defer to Congress on the
"rational basis" part of the analysis, it also revised the "affect" aspect.
Justice Rehnquist, after conceding case law has not been clear on whether
the regulated activity must "affect" or "substantially affect" interstate
commerce to fall within Congress' power to regulate, proclaimed that the
proper test henceforth will be the "substantially affects" standard.20 7 Even
under that arguably higher standard the Court has, in the past, upheld
regulation of activities which arguably have more tenuously "affected"
interstate commerce than possession of a gun in a school zone: local loan
sharking in Perez, local racial discrimination in McClung, and growth and
consumption of home-grown wheat in Wickard v. Filburn.2 8 The Rehnquist opinion distinguished Lopez from these cases by asserting that the
activities were economic in nature the way possession of a gun in a school
zone was not. 2 9 He said Lopez involved a criminal statute that' had
nothing to do with commerce or any sort of economic enterprise.2"0 This
goes back to the distinction between what is commercial and what is not.
199. Id. at 1634.
200. Id. at 1637.

201. See supra notes 78-79 and accompanying text.
202. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634.

203. Id. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.

379 U.S. 294 (1964).
402 U.S. 146 (1971).
Id. at 1663 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.
317 U.S. 111 (1942).
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630.

210. Id. at 1631.
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Again, this is part of the discredited pre-New Deal Commerce Clause
analysis. It is just too difficult for the Justices to make that decision, as the
Court discovered before the Court Packing Plan in the 1930s.21 At the
polls, the people indicated they wanted something done about the economy.
Congress responded by enacting regulatory legislation. The Court struck it
down. The Court, under great pressure, began showing more deference to
Congress, abandoning the analysis which included a determination of what
was commercial or not and what was local or not and instead, deferring to
Congress. The situation is analogous today. The people have indicated they
are concerned about crime in general and crime as it affects schools and
education in particular. Congress responded by enacting a comprehensive
crime bill of which the Gun Free School Zones Act, § 922(q), is a part.
This Court struck it down.
Even using the Court's "commercial" analysis, a good argument can be
made that educating children is an economic activity. In a heavily
researched dissent, Justice Breyer concluded that Congress could rationally
consider schools as roughly analogous to a commercial investment from
which the nation derives the benefit of an educated workforce.2 12 Breyer
noted that in the year Congress passed this statute, primary and secondary
schools spent almost a quarter of a trillion dollars which amounts to a large
part of the $5.5 trillion Gross Domestic Product for that year.2" 3 Under
this analysis, the activity in question is "commercial" in nature. Congress
could rationally find that gun possession near schools threatens the
educational process, a commercial activity which substantially affects
commerce and subsequently, our country's economic well-being. This
scenario is analogous to that in Perez where Congress apparently reasoned
that the use of force, maybe a gun, on a local street comer, to collect a debt,
aids organized crime, an activity which affects commerce. It consequently
passed, under its commerce power, a law that made local loan sharking a
federal crime.
The third problem with the majority decision is its further revitalization
of federalism principles at a time in the nation's development when our
economy is more integrated than ever before and crime fighting is one of
the country's biggest challenges. The Justices in the majority were
concerned that extension of the commerce power to a statute like § 922(q)
would upset the federal-state balance in a way that would convert the
commerce power to a general police power like that of the states.2" 4 Once
211.
212.
213.
214.

See supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1664 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id.
Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1634; see also id. at 1640-41 (Kennedy, J., concurring)
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again, the majority departed from precedent. In Maryland v. Wirtz,2 15 the
Court applied minimum wage standards to state schools and hospitals,
explicitly finding that the commerce power outweighs concerns over state
sovereignty." 6 Although this case was overruled by a 5-4 vote eight years
later in National League of Cities v. Ursery,' 7 it was reinstated in 1985
in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro Transit Authority.218 The Ursery Court
found that it was not within the commerce power to force directly on the
states Congress' choices as to how decisions about local governmental
functions should be made.21 9 In Garcia, however, the Court reversed
itself and held that states must look to the national political process for
protection from Congressional regulation under the Commerce Clause.220
In other words, if the people do not want Congress to pass a law making
possession of a gun near a school a federal crime, they will let it be known
at the polls; it is not up to the Court to protect the state's sovereign interests
in areas where they have traditionally regulated. The people can decide if
they believe the problem is of such magnitude that it requires federal
intervention. In 1991, the Court, in Gregory v. Ashcroft,22' unveiled its
"plain statement rule" which provides that "[i]f Congress intends to alter the
'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute. ' ' ' 222 Some scholars believe that this case invites
the Court to search for the traditional government functions, which Garcia
indicated was not within the judicial role.223 In its most recent case
involving use of the Tenth Amendment to protect state sovereignty, New
York v. United States,224 the Court invalidated part of a law enacted under
the Commerce Clause, however, the statute involved was an attempt by
Congress to directly force a state to regulate, it did not apply to private
activities.225

(stating that because education is a traditional concern of the states, the Court has a
"particular duty to see that the federal-state balance is not destroyed").

215. 392 U.S. 183 (1968).

216. Id. at 195.
217. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

218. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

219. Ursery,426 U.S. at 852.

220. Garcia,469 U.S. at 552.
221. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).

222. Id. at 460 (quoting Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)).
223. See generally Gehrig, supra note 18 1.

224. 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992).
225. Id. at 2429-31.
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In another area where the Court apparently departs from precedent,
Chief Justice Rehnquist suggests that the outcome of Lopez might have been

different if Congress had made formal findings of a substantial effect on

commerce. 226 However, at the same time, he acknowledges that precedent
does not so require.227 Congress did subsequently amend the Gun Free
School Zones Act to include findings. To ignore them, as Justice Breyer
22
notes, "would appear to elevate form over substance. 1
Finally, putting these kinds of judicial limits on how Congress may
regulate private activities under the Commerce Clause constitutes a major
shift in the Court's attitude. As Professor Herman Schwartz suggests, this
is "another indication that the conservatives' allegiance to judicial restraint
is selective, to say the least. '229 Schwartz believes the goal of the Court's
conservative majority is to cut back on federal power by invoking state
sovereignty even though Garcia is still good law for the federal regulation
of state activities that also extend to private activity.23 °
IV. PRACTICAL IMPACT

-It is, of course, too early to determine exactly what the impact of the
Lopez decision will be, although there have been a rash of appeals to the
lower federal courts in its wake. Because Lopez found that Congress had
exceeded its power under the Commerce Clause in passing the Gun Free
School Zones Act of 1990,231 petitioners convicted under other statutes

enacted via the Commerce Clause power want their statutes invalidated as
well. Generally, courts have declined to do so, sometimes over vehement
protest from dissenters who accuse the majority of misreading the lessons
of Lopez.232
226. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632.
227. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299 (1964) (noting that "no
formal findings were made, which of course are not necessary"); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448
U.S. 448, 503 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring) ("After Congress has legislated repeatedly in
an area of national concern, its members gain experience that may reduce the need for fresh
hearings or prolonged debate").
228. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1658 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
229. See Schwartz, supra note 90, at 25.
230. Id. at 28.
231. 18 U.S.C. § 922(q) (1994); see Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1624.
232. See, e.g., United States v. Kuban, 94 F.3d 971, 976-78 (5th Cir. 1996) (DeMoss,
J., dissenting in part). Justice DeMoss found, in dissent, that Lopez is a "fundamental and
landmark restatement .. of the powers of Congress under the Commerce Clause" and stated
that under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), the possession by a convicted felon of a firearm must now
"substantially affect" interstate commerce; the fact that it traveled interstate many years
before the current possession should not be sufficient under Lopez. Id. at 977-78. The Fifth
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This section will review how the lower federal courts have analyzed
Commerce Clause challenges since the decision was handed down in April
of 1995.233
Post-Lopez courts may take a two-step approach to the analysis of a
Commerce Clause challenge. First, they will decide in which of the three
categories outlined in Lopez" 4 Congress is attempting to regulate. If a
court finds that the case falls within the first two, regulating the use of the
channels of interstate commerce or of activities that threaten instrumentalities or persons in interstate commerce, then the Congressional regulation is
a proper exercise of the commerce power and no further analysis is needed.
Therefore, the category determination is key to the outcome of the case. If
the court determines that the regulation falls into the third category,
affecting interstate commerce, a second analysis is necessary. As evidenced
below, the lower courts appear to be unclear about exactly what that
analysis should include.
The Ninth Circuit, in US. v. Pappadopoulos,2" was one of the first
appellate courts to use the Lopez decision to reverse a conviction. The
defendant had been charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), which
provides:
Whoever maliciously damages or destroys.., by means
of fire or explosive, any building, vehicle or other real or
personal property used in interstate or foreign commerce
or in any activity affecting interstate or foreign commerce
shall be imprisoned for not more than 20 years, fined the
greater of the fine under this title or the cost of repairing
or replacing any property that is damaged or destroyed,,
[sic] or both .... 236
In Pappadopoulos,the defendant and her husband, experiencing severe
financial problems, were convicted of conspiring with another man to bum
down the Pappadopoulos home. 237 To establish the jurisdictional element
Circuit has upheld the constitutionality of § 922(g)(1) post-Lopez, as has each circuit which
has considered the measure. See, e.g., United States v. Sorrentino, 72 F.3d 294 (2d Cir.
1995); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Chesney, 86
F.3d 564 (6th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bell, 70 F.3d 495 (7th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Polanco, 93 F.3d 555 (9th Cir. 1996); United States v. Bolton, 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir.
1995); United States v. McAllister, 77 F.3d 387 (1 1th Cir. 1996).
233. Case review current as of December 30, 1996.
234. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629-30.
235. 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995).
236. 18 U.S.C. § 844(i) (1994).
237. Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d at 524.
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necessary (that the property was "used in" or "used in any activity affecting"
interstate or foreign commerce), the government prosecutors relied on the
theory that the home was "used in" or "used in an activity affecting"
interstate commerce because it received natural gas from a company which
obtained its product partially from out-of-state sources.238 Pappadopoulos,
argued that receiving natural gas from an out-of-state source was not
sufficient as a matter of law to establish the requisite nexus to interstate
commerce.2 39 The District Court found otherwise.24° The Supreme
Court decided in Russell v. United States,24 1 that § 844(i) reached all
business property as well as some that might not fit in that category, but
maybe not every private home.242 The Pappadopoulos court, therefore,
set out to decide whether Congress could constitutionally prohibit destruction of this private home under its commerce clause power.243 Using the
three broad categories of activities that Congress may regulate under its
commerce clause power as delineated in Lopez, 44 the Pappadopoulos
court determined that this case should be analyzed under Congress' power
to regulate intrastate activities that "substantially affect" interstate commerce,
the third category. 241 In prosecuting this defendant, the government relied
on the Wickard line of cases, arguing that even though the effect on
commerce of the destruction of one house that receives out-of-state gas may
not be great, the combined effect "of many others similarly situated, is far
from trivial. 2 46 The court found this argument unpersuasive and stated,
quoting Lopez, that the Wickard line of cases "may not be extended so as
to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to
embrace them, in view of our complex society, would effectually obliterate
the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a
completely centralized government. '247 The Court cited again to Lopez for
its conclusion that the activity in Wickard, raising wheat for home
consumption, was an economic activity in a way that possession of a gun
in a school zone was not.248
238. Id. at 525.

239.
240.
241.
242.

Id.
Id.
471 U.S. 858 (1985).
Id. at 862.

243. Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d at 525.

244. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1629.

245. Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d at 526.
246. Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128.

247. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1628-29 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301

U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).

248. Id. at 1630.
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This court found that arson, the conduct regulated by § 844(i), is like
that in Lopez, not commercial or economic in nature.249 It concluded that
because arson is not economic in nature and because criminal law is
primarily enforced by local authorities, the government must, on a case by
case basis, prove the jurisdictional element in the statute; the nexus to
interstate commerce.25 In this respect, Pappadopoulos is different than
Lopez in that the Gun Free School Zones Act did not include a jurisdictional
element. The Court found that omission to be one of its fatal flaws. This
statute does contain such an element; the question is whether it had been
met. The court determined that Lopez mandates a "substantial" effect on
interstate commerce to assure that the statute is constitutional and holds that
when Congress seeks to regulate an intrastate activity that has traditionally
been exclusively regulated by local authorities and the connection of the
activity to interstate commerce is not apparent nor illuminated by express
constitutional findings, then the government must show a "substantial" effect
on or connection to interstate commerce.25' It then concluded that
receiving natural gas from an out-of-state source is insufficient as a matter
of law to confer federal jurisdiction over the § 844(i) count.2 52 Again
quoting Lopez, the court found that if the Commerce Clause were extended
to reach activity at this private house the court would be "hard-pressed to
posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to
regulate. '253 The court concluded its analysis with a warning that the
Wickard line of cases poses a threat to federalism and a statement that
simple state arson crime should be tried in state courts.254
While no circuit has explicitly disagreed with Pappadopoulos,several
have held convictions under § 844(i) to be proper when the target of the
arsonist was a business or rental property, as opposed to a private home.255
The Supreme Court had already determined, in Russell v. United States,25 6
that § 844(i) reached all business property, but left open the question of
whether private homes would be covered.2 57
249. Pappadopoulos,64 F.3d at 526.
250. Id. at 526-27.
251. Id. at 527.
252. Id.
253. Id. (quoting Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632).
254. Id. at 528.
255. See, e.g., United States v. DiSanto, 86 F.3d 1238, 1245 (1st Cir. 1996) (holding
that § 844(i) includes the requisite jurisdictional element which insures that the property
damaged must have been used in intrastate commerce or in an activity affecting interstate
commerce. Business property fits in these categories).
256. 471 U.S. 858 (1985).
257. Id. at 862.
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In Pappadopoulos,the Ninth Circuit apparently read the Lopez decision
as license for the courts to once again determine what is a local activity and
what is not as well as what is a commercial/economic activity and what is
not in analyzing Congressional enactments under the Commerce Clause.
This kind of "super-review" is the antithesis of the sixty years of deference
shown to Congress by the Court in its traditional rational basis review of
laws passed under the Commerce Clause.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit upheld a § 844(i) conviction, turning
back a Lopez-based challenge, because the building involved was a
rental.258 The court acknowledged it might be on shaky ground accepting
the government's argument that the rental character of the property gave it
its "interstate hook," stating that Lopez "suggests that the winds of interstate
commerce jurisprudence may have shifted, albeit slightly, against these
expansive understandings of what it means for a building to be 'used in
interstate or foreign commerce or in any activity affecting interstate or
foreign commerce."' 259
This judge is not alone in his uncertainty. In United States v.
Davis,260 the Senior United States Judge for the Eastern District of
Virginia concurred in the result, upholding a federal arson conviction, but
" '
The
wrote separately because of his Commerce Clause concerns.26
a
federal
it
which
makes
§
844(0
18
U.S.C.
under
charged
defendant was
crime to destroy or attempt to destroy by means of fire or explosive a
building used by an organization receiving federal assistance.2 62 The
victim received a partial rent subsidy from a state agency, which received
a portion of its funds from the federal government.263 The judge questioned whether this "lengthy chain" supports the assertion of federal
jurisdiction to punish the defendant based simply on the fact that the
townhouse that was damaged was used by an organization receiving federal
funds.2 64 He writes, "Once we accept the reasoning necessary to permit
this perhaps tolerable extension of federal jurisdiction, little is left to stop
the intolerable. What local or state agency does not receive some form of
federal assistance? 2 65 The judge concludes his opinion with his hope that

258. See United States v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1995).
259. Id. at 1427.
260. 98 F.3d 141 (4th Cir. 1996).
261. Id. at 146 (Doumar, J., concurring).
262. 18 U.S.C. § 844(f) (1994).
263. Davis, 98 F.3d at 143-44.
264. Id. at 146.
265. Id. at 147. Note that among the state or local agencies mentioned is the public
school, the same agency which is at issue in Lopez. Id.
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the Supreme Court will continue the process begun in Lopez so that the
extension of federal jurisdiction permitted in this case will no longer be
acceptable today.266
Lower court analysis of challenges to the Hobbs Act are illustrative of
lower court confusion in applying the Lopez rationale. In United States v.
Bolton,267 the Tenth Circuit, in upholding a conviction under the Hobbs
Act,26 found the Act, enacted under the Commerce Clause, was constitutional. The Hobbs Act provides for punishment of anyone who obstructs,
delays, or affects commerce by robbery or extortion.269 Mr. Bolton was
found guilty of four local robberies and convicted under the Hobbs Act,
which he challenged as an unconstitutional extension of federal power under
the Commerce Clause. 27" He contended that Lopez required the government to show a substantial effect on commerce to support a conviction.27 '
The government argued that the effect of the robberies was to prevent the
victim businesses from buying supplies from out of state, in interstate commerce. 72 This court interpreted Lopez as holding that there is no requirement that the government show that individual instances of the regulated
activity substantially affect commerce as long as the activity, in the
aggregate, has that effect.273 It found that unlike possession of a firearm
in a school zone, robbery and extortion are activities that through repetition
can substantially affect interstate commerce and that robbery and extortion
are economic activities.2 74 At least two other circuits concur.2 5
However, there seems to be a split in authority in the Ninth Circuit.
In cases decided within days of each other, two different panels came to
different results, at least as to what the prosecution must prove to satisfy the
jurisdictional requirement after Lopez. In United States v. Sherwood,276
the court found that prior to Lopez, prosecutors in a Hobbs Act case only

266. Id. Note also that this judge, as per Lopez, cautions against "blind acceptance of

incessant federal invasion into spheres which should be occupied by the States." Id.
267. 68 F.3d 396 (10th Cir. 1995).

268. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1994).
269. Bolton, 68 F.3d at 400.

270. Id. at 398.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at 399.
274. Id.
275. See United States v. Stillo, 57 F.3d 553 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
383 (1995); United States v. Farmer, 73 F.3d 836, 843 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2570 (1996) (holding that Lopez has no application to robbery of commercial
establishments).

276. 98 F.3d 402 (9th Cir. 1996).
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had to show a de minimis effect on interstate commerce to establish the
federal jurisdiction requirement.277
Now, prosecutors must show a
substantial effect on or connection to interstate commerce - if Congress is
seeking to regulate purely intrastate noncommercial activity that has
traditionally been subject to exclusive regulation by the state or local
government - like robbery - and the link to interstate commerce is not
readily apparent nor illuminated by Congressional findings.2 78 In Sherwood, the court wrote that "assuming" that the government had to show a
substantial effect on interstate commerce, a scheme to extort more than a
million dollars from a Las Vegas casino constituted the requisite effect.279
At the same time, in United States v. Atcheson, 28 ° a different panel found
that because the Hobbs Act is concerned only with interstate, rather than
intrastate activities, the "substantially affects" test from Lopez is not
applicable. 28 ' The court found that where the crime itself directly affects
interstate commerce, as in the Hobbs Act, a substantial effect on interstate
commerce need not be shown to empower Congress to regulate the activity;
282
a de minimis effect is sufficient.
To add to the confusion, a federal district court in the Ninth Circuit,
deciding a Hobbs Act case at virtually the same time, found that "given
Lopez and Pappadopoulos,it appears that the de minimis approach of the
past to interstate commerce jurisdictional inquiries is no longer good
' The court
law."283
went on to find that the robbery of three local jewelry
stores and the attempted robbery of a fourth did not have a "substantial
effect" on interstate commerce and reversed a Hobbs Act conviction.28 4
Much controversy has been generated over a statute which is very
similar to the one invalidated in Lopez, 18 U.S.C. § 922(o), which makes
it unlawful for any person to transfer or possess a machine gun. Both are
criminal statutes which regulate the purely intrastate possession of guns,
both lack jurisdictional elements, and Congress made no findings regarding
the link between the intrastate activity, possession, and interstate com-

277. Id. at 411.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. 94 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 1996).
281. Id. at 1242.
282. Id. at 1242-43.
283. United States v. Woodruff, 941 F. Supp. 910, 923 (N.D. Cal. 1996).
284. Id. at 927. ("[T]he court . . . sees no necessary correlation between the local
robberies at bar and a substantial aggregate effect on interstate commerce and is unwilling
to engage in speculation in this regard.") The court cited Lopez stating that "to uphold the
Government's contentions here, we would have to pile inference on top of inference." Id.
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merce.285 Despite the similarities, at least six circuits have upheld §
922(o) as a valid exercise of Congressional power under the Commerce
Clause, using various rationales.286
Courts seem comfortable in upholding § 922(o), despite its similarity
to the statute in Lopez, because of Congress' long history in regulating
firearms. As the Third Circuit writes, § 922(o) did not "plow new ground"
as the Lopez majority said § 922(q) did.287 The dissenting judge in the
Third Circuit case, however, disagrees and finds no congressional findings
regarding, specifically, the effect of possession of a machine gun on
interstate commerce.2 88 The majority writes that Lopez does not require
Congress to play "Show and Tell" with the judiciary,28 9 but one might
argue this is precisely what the Court requires when a jurisdictional element
is missing from the statute itself. In Lopez, the government argued that
Congress, through previous enactments, had expertise in gun regulation29 °
but the Court found that such previous findings did not justify § 922(q)
because they did not address the precise subject matter of this law nor its
relationship with interstate commerce.291 This is the same rationale the
dissenting judge in the Third Circuit case uses in arguing that § 922(o)
should be invalidated under Lopez.292 A similar concern was raised in
dissenting opinions filed in the Fifth and Sixth Circuit cases upholding §
922(o).293

285. See United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 1996) (Alito, J., dissenting).
286. Some courts have held that § 922(o)'s attempt to control the market for machine
guns regulates the use of the channels of interstate commerce. See United ,States v. Kirk, 70
F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1996); United States v. Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d 781 (6th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Rambo, 74 F.3d 948 (9th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S.Ct. 72 (1996). Others have
held that § 922(o) regulates activities that threaten the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce. See United States v. Wilks, 58 F.3d 1518 (10th Cir. 1995); seealso United States
v. Kenney, 91 F.3d 884 (7th Cir. 1996).
287. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 279.
288. Id. at 294 (Alito, J., dissenting).
289. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 282.
290. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1632 (1995).

291. Id.
292. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 294 (Alito, J., dissenting). Judge Alito stated that:
In sum, we are left with no congressional findings... for the proposition that the

purely intrastate possession of machine guns . . . has a substantial effect on

interstate commerce, and without such support I do not see how the statutory
provision at issue here can be sustained - unless, contrary to the lesson that I take
from Lopez, the "substantial effects" test is to be drained of all practical significance. Id.
293. See Kirk, 70 F.3d at 802 (Jones, J., dissenting) (stating that § 922(o) is a purely

criminal law with no nexus to commercial activity and that congressional findings do not
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The Fifth Circuit, the court which originally struck down the Gun Free
School Zones Act in Lopez, upheld a conviction for unlawful possession of
294
a machine gun under 18 U.S.C. § 922(o) in United States v. Kirk,
finding Congress did not exceed its power under the Commerce Clause
because machine guns are items in interstate commerce.2 95 This is an
example of how a court's choice of category is key to the outcome of the
case. The Fifth Circuit put the regulation in Lopez's first category: attempts
to prohibit the interstate transportation of a commodity through the channels
of commerce, even if the activity itself is purely intrastate and is a lawful
enactment under the commerce power.2 96 As a result, no "affects"
analysis is necessary. However, the dissenting judge in Kirk would have
struck down § 922(o) under the logic of Lopez. 297 She found that mere
intrastate possession of a machine gun is not a use of the channels of
interstate commerce any more than mere intrastate possession of a
basketball 29' and refuses to analyze the statute under category one. She
found that § 922(o), like the Gun Free School Zones Act, does not require
a nexus to commerce nor does it include explicit findings by Congress that
banning mere machine gun possession is essential to effectuate federal
regulation.299 Taken along with her judgment that § 922(o), like the Gun
Free School Zones Act, is a "criminal statute that has nothing to do with
(commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise,"30 0 she concluded that
enforcement of § 922(o) would "intrude the federal police power into every
village and remote enclave of this vast and diverse nation. '
Since Lopez, several defendants have challenged their convictions on
federal gun and ammunition possession charges, but their appeals have been
rejected because courts are analyzing those enactments on the theory that the
weapons and ammunition once traveled in interstate commerce, again
avoiding the "affects" test.30 2

speak to the subject matter of the law or its relation to interstate commerce); Beuckelaere,
91 F.3d at 788 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (stating that § 922(o), like § 922(q), has no
requirement that possession have a concrete tie to interstate commerce).
294. 70 F.3d 791 (5th Cir. 1995).
295. Id. at 795-96.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 798 (Jones, J., dissenting) (finding no "meaningful" distinction between the
statute challenged in this case and the Gun Free School Zones Act struck down in Lopez).
298. Id. at 800.
299. 70 F.3d at 800.
300. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1630-31.
301. Kirk, 70 F.3d at 802.
302. See, e.g., United States v. Hanna, 55 F.3d 1456 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding decision
not predicated on whether firearm affected interstate commerce but that firearm had
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Carjacking statutes are also surviving post-Lopez challenges, based on
the same theory. Courts are finding that cars are instrumentalities of
commerce and thus are in the "in commerce" category for analysis.3 °3 It
is, however, at least possible that, like in Pappadopoulos,a court could in
the future apply Lopez and find that stealing a privately owned car intrastate
is a purely state crime that should be handled by the state courts.3" 4 That
is the problem with the local/federal distinction Lopez now apparently allows
courts to make when considering if an activity "affects" interstate commerce.
In the wake of Lopez, anti-abortion activists have unsuccessfully
challenged the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act of 1994
("FACE"),3"' enacted by Congress using its Commerce Clause power. For
example, the Eleventh Circuit, in Cheffer v. Reno,3" 6 held that the Act,
which prohibits violent and destructive conduct at abortion clinics, is within
Congress' Commerce Clause power."' It found that, unlike the Lopez
statute, FACE regulates a commercial activity (provision of reproductive
health services) and that Congress made extensive findings about the effect
of the activity on interstate commerce.30 ' All other circuits considering
similar challenges concurred, 30 9 however, they used differing rationales to
reach the same result. At least two found that the Act regulates provisions

previously moved in interstate commerce). But see the dissenting opinions in Rybar, 103

F.3d at 286-94 (Alito, J., dissenting), and Beuckelaere, 91 F.3d at 787-88 (Suhrheinrich, J.,
dissenting), each arguing that guns traveling in interstate commerce years before current
possession is an insufficient tie to interstate commerce.
303. See, e.g., United States v. Oliver, 60 F.3d 547 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding statute in
question, 18 U.S.C. § 2, contains requisite jurisdictional requirement, cars moving in
interstate commerce, lacking in Gun Free School Zones Act).
304. This is, in fact, the approach taken by the dissenting judge in United States v.
Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 590 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part). Justice Becker argues that in enacting the carjacking statute, Congress was not
concerned about the effect of carjacking on interstate commerce, but in putting a stop to
violent local crime - a matter for the states, not the federal government, to regulate. Id. at
600.
305. Pub. L. No. 103-259, 108 Stat. 694 (1994) (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 248).
306. 55 F.3d 1517 (11th Cir. 1995).
307. Id. at 1519.

308. Id. at 1520.

309. See Planned Parenthood Assoc. of Southeastern Pa. v. Walton, 949 F. Supp. 290,

295 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (stating that every post-Lopez appellate decision that has considered the
Commerce Clause issue has rejected the position that protest activities do not have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce).
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of reproductive health services and thus is commercial in nature;"' ° others
have done the "affects" test required by category three."a '
At the district court level, several judges were willing to invalidate
FACE after considering Lopez-based challenges. For example, the court in
United States v. Wilson3" 2 found that the Act did not regulate the health
providers - commercial entities - but private conduct affecting those
entities." 3 It also found that abortion clinic demonstrations are like
trespassing, a "local" offense for state or local, not federal, regulation." 4
However, the decision was reversed on appeal by the Seventh Circuit which
held that Congress made several rational findings that FACE regulates
activities that affect interstate commerce and therefore did not exceed its
Commerce Clause power when enacting the statute.3" 5 One federal district
court holding FACE unconstitutional found "no significant distinction"
between FACE and the Gun Free School Zones Act struck down in
3 17
Lopez. 31 6 An appeal is pending.
Other federal legislation under attack post-Lopez include those measures
which attempt to regulate in the area of family law, an area both the
majority and dissenting opinions in Lopez agreed was off-limits to
Congress .318 The U.S. district courts have split over the constitutionality
of the Child Support Recovery Act3t 9 which makes it a federal crime to
fail to pay child support when the payor lives in a different state from the
child. 32" Again, the courts are having difficulty determining if nonpayment of child support is an economic activity and if it has the requisite
substantial effect on interstate commerce to survive post-Lopez. 32 ' The
three circuit courts which have considered the case have found the requisite
link to interstate commerce and have upheld the statute.322 Another such
310. See, e.g., United States v. Wilson, 73 F.3d 615, 683 (7th Cir. 1995); Cheffer v.
Reno, 55 F.3d 1517, 1520 (1lth Cir. 1995).
311. See, e.g., Terry v. Reno, 101 F.3d 1412 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
312. 880 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Wis. 1995), rev'd, 73 F.3d 675 (7th Cir. 1995).
313. Id.at 628.
314. Id. at 634.
315. Wilson, 73 F.3d 675, 688 (7th Cir. 1995).
316. See Hoffman v. Hunt, 923 F. Supp. 791 (W.D.N.C. 1996).
317. See id.
318. See Lopez, 115 S. Ct. at 1161-63.
319. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1994). For a list of district courts which have considered
challenges to this section post-Lopez and their holdings, see United States v. Hampshire, 95
F.3d 999, 1002-03 (10th Cir. 1996).
320. See 18 U.S.C. § 228(a) (1994).
321. See Hampshire, 95 F.3d at 1002-03.
322. Id. at 1003-04; see United States v. Mussari, 95 F.3d 787 (9th Cir. 1996); United
States v. Sage, 92 F.3d 101 (2d Cir. 1996).
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32 3
gives victims of
law, the Violence Against Women Act ("VAWA")
violence motivated by gender a federal civil rights cause of action and was
enacted under the Commerce Clause.324 To date, only two district courts
have considered post-Lopez challenges to VAWA and each came to a
32 5 These courts agreed
different conclusion regarding its constitutionality.
should be analyzed in category three - given the
that the regulation
"affects" test326 - but the courts differed as to whether the impact of
327
domestic violence was sufficient to meet the Lopez standard.
At least one member of the Supreme Court has indicated he would take
the Lopez decision further and into another area. Clarence Thomas
dissented from the Court's decision to deny certiorari in Cargill,Inc. v.
United States.32 In that case, a private company which owns land near
a federal wildlife refuge, challenged the Army Corps of Engineers' jurisdiction over its property under the Clean Water Act.329 The Corps had
ordered the company to halt activities on its land because of the presence of
migratory birds.33 ° The regulations purport to give the Corps jurisdiction
over waters which are or would be used as habitat by migratory birds which
cross state lines.33 ' The lower courts found that the presence on the
property of birds that had crossed state lines creates a sufficient connection
to interstate commerce to permit the regulation. 32 Thomas found this
basis for federal jurisdiction over the private property to be more "far'
Thomas' remarks
fetched than that offered, and rejected, in Lopez."333
federal land-use
of
limits
the
about
questions
indicate that constitutional
power,
commerce
the
through
regulation under the Clean Water Act, enacted
33 4
future.
the
in
Court
the
may be raised by

323. 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994).

324. Id.
325. See Brzonkala v. Virginia Polytechnic and State Univ., 935 F. Supp. 772 (W.D.
Va. 1996); Doe v. Doe, 929 F. Supp. 608 (D. Conn. 1996).
326. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 789; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 615.
327. See Brzonkala, 935 F. Supp. at 792; Doe, 929 F. Supp. at 614-15.
328. 116 S.Ct. 407 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
329. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1994).
330. Cargill, 116 S.Ct. at 407 (Thomas, J., dissenting).

331. Id. at 408.

332. Id.
333. Id. at 408-09.
334. Also note that there have been several challenges to federal environmental
regulations post-Lopez. One such action challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-44 (1994). See National Assoc. of Home
Builders v. Babbit, 949 F. Supp. 1, 7-8 (D. D.C. Dec. 6, 1996) (holding that a rare species
of a fly is a "thing" in interstate commerce, even though it inhabits only one specific area in
one state, because it is on display in out-of-state museums and has been traded interstate by
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It appears that although most federal statutes are surviving post-Lopez
challenges, the rationales for upholding them are not uniform between, or
sometimes even within, the circuits.3
In addition, several of these
challenged statutes have been upheld over vigorous dissents which chide
their brethren on the bench for ignoring the teachings of Lopez.33 6
Whether or not the Lopez decision will have a major impact on commerce
clause jurisprudence remains unknown. The lower courts may or may not
be interpreting Lopez the way the Supreme Court intended. As the Sixth
Circuit wrote in deciding a Lopez-based challenge to a federal gambling
regulation:337
Lopez casts a shadow on regulation that is tenuously
related to interstate commerce ....
Until the Supreme
Court provides a clearer signal or cogent framework to
handle this type of legislation, this court is content to
heed the concurrence of two Justices that the history of
Commerce Clause jurisprudence still "counsels great
restraint.""33

The Third Circuit concurs, also referencing the opinion of those two

Justices, O'Connor and Kennedy, that "despite protestations to the contrary,
'
the winds have not shifted that much."339
However, the dissent observes
that Justices O'Connor and Kennedy join in Chief Justice Rehnquist's

insect collectors). The constitutionality of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act ("CERCLA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-75 (1994), has also been
challenged. See United States v. Olin Corp., 927 F. Supp. 1502, 1533 (S.D. Ala. 1996)
(holding that the Congressional enactment of CERCLA regulates an activity, environmental
cleanup, which has "virtually no effect on interstate commerce"). But see United States v.
NL Industries, 936 F. Supp. 545,562 (S.D. Ill. 1996) (CERCLA found constitutional because
Congress had a "rational basis to conclude that the improper disposal of hazardous waste
substantially affects interstate commerce").
335. See, e.g., notes 267-84 and accompanying text.
336. See, e.g., United States v. Bishop, 66 F.3d 569, 603 (3d Cir. 1995) (Becker, J.,
dissenting in part) (finding that pre-Lopez, federal courts were right to conclude that federal
car-jacking statute was constitutional, even though it stretched the outer limits of the
commerce clause; but after Lopez, it was correct to find the statute unconstitutional. "The
outer boundary has shifted . . . Lopez is not just another Supreme Court case, but a
watershed").
337. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1955 (1994).
338. See United States v. Wall, 92 F.3d 1444, 1451-52 (6th Cir. 1996) (quoting Lopez,
115 S. Ct. at 1634 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
339. See Bishop, 66 F.3d at 590.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

opinion and "since five is more than four, I view Lopez as a beacon that we
must follow ....,340

V. FUTURE IMPACT
The future impact of Lopez may be difficult to gauge without further
guidance from the Supreme Court. However, there has already been some
speculation as to the effect of the decision, both substantively and in the
area of constitutional law.
There are those who believe that substantively the case is not very
important because there are still about forty state laws which cover
possession of guns in school zones. 41 Others believe that, on principle,
the Court should discourage federalization of criminal law, arguing that
3 42 The
criminal cases now consume half of the federal judiciary's time.
Commerce Clause is the primary basis for congressional authority in this
area.

34 3

However, a good argument can be made that some social ills, including
school violence, are national in scope and require involvement by the federal
government.344 The Lopez decision may discourage Congress from even
attempting to legislate in areas where the effect on interstate commerce may
be perceived as "insubstantial" under the Lopez analysis. And yet, the
problem may be severe. In the area of school violence, for example, the
National School Safety Center estimates that more than 100,000 students
carry a gun to school every day, and in 1987, more than 250,000 students
brought a gun to school at least once. 345 Between July 1, 1992, and May
26, 1994, seventy-four intentional deaths were reported on school campuses
and forty-seven of those were handgun-related.3 46 One could argue that
federalism concerns are outweighed by a need to address this widespread
347
and pervasive problem of gun violence in schools.

As for other federal criminal enactments under the Commerce Clause,
they may survive post-Lopez challenges or not, depending on how the Court
classifies the activity being regulated. Crimes involving the instrumentalities
340. Id. at 591 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
341. See Schwartz, supra note 90, at 25.
342. See Chippendale, supra note 16, at 456.
343. Id. at 459.
344. See Gehrig, supra note 181, at 180.
•345. Id. at 216.
346. Id. at 180 (citing Amicus Brief for the National School Safety Center at 4, United
States v.Lopez, 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993) (No. 93-1260) (citing NATIONAL SCHOOL
SAFETY CENTER, SCHOOL ASSOCIATED VIOLENT DEATHS 7 (1994))).
347. Id. at 217.
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of interstate commerce (like destruction of an airplane) or involving the
channels of interstate commerce (like shipment of stolen goods) should
survive.348 But those involving activity that only "substantially affect"
interstate commerce may be in jeopardy.34 9 As indicated above, appellate
courts seem unsure how to look at federal drson laws350 and even gun
" '
possession statutes.35
Should the courts determine that the building
burned or the gun possessed are not instrumentalities of commerce and fall
into the "affects" category, the link to commerce may not be strong enough
to satisfy the Lopez standard.
The impact of the Lopez decision may reach other areas in addition to
crime and education. As noted above, there have been post-Lopez
challenges in areas such as the environment, child support and abortion
clinic protests. Some suggest that any area where Congress is regulating
local activities related to interstate commerce may be vulnerable to
constitutional attack, including farming and mining legislation.3 52 For
example, the Clean Water Act was enacted under the Commerce Clause
power. If potential use of wetlands by migratory birds is not considered a
sufficient connection to interstate commerce to invoke the clause, Congress
may not be able to regulate isolated wetlands.353 As indicated above,
Justice Thomas has already indicated that he does not find that connection
sufficient to trigger congressional Commerce Clause power.354
Substantive issues aside, Lopez may also signal a major change in
constitutional law.355 However, because of a lack of clarity about the
"substantially affects" standard and how closely the Court may scrutinize the
link between the regulated activity and interstate commerce, it is too early
to determine exactly what impact the decision will have on limiting the
Commerce Clause power. 356 It is probable, however, that the Court's

348. See Stewart, supra note 8, at 48.
349. Id.
350. See United States v. Pappadopoulos, 64 F.3d 522 (9th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Martin, 63 F.3d 1422 (7th Cir. 1995).
351. See United States v. Kirk, 70 F.3d 791, 795-96 (5th Cir. 1995) (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
352. See Schwartz, supra note 90, at 28.
353. John A. Leman, Comment, The Birds: Regulation of Isolated Wetlands and the
Limits of the Commerce Clause, 28 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1237, 1241-43 (1995).
354. See Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 116 S.Ct. 407 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
355. See Stewart, supra note 8, at 48 ("The potential impact of Lopez is intriguing
because it may mark either a major change in constitutional law or only the boundary of the
outer limits of congressional power.").
356. See Schwartz, supra note 90, at 28.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

majority will turn back Congressional attempts to use the clause to regulate
into areas where states have traditionally been in control.357
CONCLUSION

The Lopez case was about power - specifically, whether Congress has
the power under the Commerce Clause to make a federal crime out of
possession of a gun on school property. The answer was no. The real
question for the future, though, is whether Lopez is sending a message to
Congress that it should refrain from legislating in areas where states have
traditionally had control or whether a future statute similar to Lopez would
survive analysis if Congress initially made strong findings about the
regulated activity's "effect" on interstate commerce and wrote a nexus
requirement into the law.
Because of the majority's evident concern about federalism issues, it
is likely Congress will face an uphill battle in legislating in areas that only
"affect" interstate commerce, if the Court determines those activities are
"local" in nature. Given the serious "local" issues, like those involving
crime and education, facing the country on a nationwide scale today, it is
likely the people may demand federal intervention. If so, this Court may
find itself in the same position it did when opposing popular New Deal
programs. And we know what happened then.
DEBBIE ELLIS
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